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Chapter
3 |
3.
Setting The Context |
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3.1
Introduction
3.2 Setting the strategic, organisational and risk management context
3.3 Defining
required resources
3.4
Defining risk assessment project timing
3.5
Establishing clear accountability
3.6
Risk Assessment Pitfalls |
3. |
Setting the Context
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3.1
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Introduction |
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As
part of the overall management of hazards associated with any
operation, it would be anticipated that the organisation would have
a Safety Management System (SMS). This system would be an integral
part of the operation's total management process.
The purpose of the SMS is to ensure safe operation of a facility,
by providing a comprehensive and integrated process for systematically
managing all aspects of the adopted control measures. To achieve this
purpose, the SMS must not only be comprehensive and integrated with
respect to the control measures, it needs to be suitable and appropriate
to the specific facility, it must be used in practice, and must be
reviewed and revised whenever the circumstances require.
A SMS will typically have a set of generic elements forming a continuous
improvement cycle. Such a cycle could be
Policy and
objectives
Standards and
targets
Planning and
prioritising
Implementation
Monitoring
Audit
Corrective
action
Review
with a continual improvement loop back.
As a specific example, the API Model EHS Management System is comprised
of 5 components in a continual improvement loop. The components are
defined as:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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vision, Policy and Management Commitment
Plan
Management Leadership
Responsibilities/Accountabilities
Risk Assessment/Management
Compliance and other requirements
EHS Planning and Programmes
Do
Personnel Training and Contractor Services
Documentation and communications
Facilities design and construction
Operations, Maintenance and Management of Change
Community Awareness and Emergency Response
Assess
EHS Performance Monitoring and Measurement
Incident Investigation, Reporting and Analysis
EHS Management Systems Audit
Adjust
Management Review and Adjustment |
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As
can be seen Risk Assessment/Management is a key component of the Planning
stage on which the remainder of the cycle depends. This Guideline
is focussed on this Risk Assessment component within the overall context
of the SMS.
For example, to explore more information on various Safety Management
Systems approaches try: |
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http://www.workcover.vic.gov.au/vwa/home.nsf/pages/so_majhaz_guidance/$File/GN12.pdf |
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NSW
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1995. Guidelines for
Preparation of Safety Management Systems, Hazardous Industries
Planning Advisory Paper No.9. ISBN 0 7310 3062 6. This useful resource
is only available as a hardcopy. The publication can be purchased
online (http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au)
or
alternatively contact the Department. |
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American
Petroleum Institute, 1998. Model Environmental, Health and Safety
(EHS) Management System, API 9100A. This
useful resource is only available as a hardcopy. The publication can
be purchased online (http://global.ihs.com/search_res.cfm?currency_code=USD&customer_id=21254D4D5BOA
&shopping_cart_id=2724482F2F4A40304F5B4020250A&rid-AP&country_code=US&lang_
code=ENGL&input_doc_number=API%209100A&org_code=API) |
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American
Petroleum Institute, 1998. Guidance Document for Model EHS System,
API 9100B. This
useful resource is only available as a hardcopy. The publication can
be purchased online (http://global.ihs.com/search_res.cfm?currency_code=USD&customer_id=21254D4D5EOA&
shopping_cart_id=2724482F2F4A40304F5B4020250A&rid=API&country_code=US&lang_
code=ENGL&input_doc_number=API%209100B&org_code=API). |
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Setting the strategic, organisational and risk management context
Expected outcomes of this step include: |
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Corporate / site commitment |
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There should be a documented organisation or site commitment to the
process of proactively considering hazards and risks during the making
of key decisions in the project or operation. This type of commitment
may be mentioned in a risk management related documents but should
be expanded in more detail, for example in a procedure, in order to
deal with issues noted below. |
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| Application
and defined expected deliverables of risk assessment & risk management
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The
context for risk assessment (i.e. the procedure) in an organisation
or site should identify the situations where application of risk assessment
is required. THIS IS A KEY ISSUE. The selected applications
would likely consider the most important decisions in the organisation.
This
might include identification of expected deliverables such as procedures,
plans, operating guidelines, design review information or others.
Defining the deliverables of the risk assessment is necessary before
the selection of the most appropriate analytical method. (See Chapter
4 of this guideline on Scoping
/ Designing the Risk Assessment). Some
organisations have “procedures’ that cover the method(s) of risk
assessment but give little guidance on the reasons for applying
the methods. THIS IS A KEY ISSUE This may lead to the situation
where risk assessment is done without a clear image of the desired
deliverable. In other words the objective is to do a risk assessment,
rather than produce a useful deliverable such as a key plan, operational
recommendations, design review recommendations, safe job procedure,
etc. This problem may lead to ineffective use and appreciation of
risk assessment. |
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3.3 |
Defining required resources
Resources are required for a risk assessment and, as such, should
be recognised in the relevant policy or procedure. Resources for some
risk assessment methods include a facilitator, a suitable team, a
suitable room, information recording equipment, the required time,
etc. However, in addition there may be resources to scope or design
the risk assessment and resources to gather information on the existence,
nature or magnitude of hazards, as well as resources to take the required
action as a result of the assessment.
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Sometimes
risk assessment teams are created with conveniently available personnel
such as those on light duties, even though they may be, at best,
only basically familiar with the system being reviewed when compared
to other site personnel. This is undesirable and compromising to
the entire process. THIS IS A KEY ISSUE |
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3.4 |
Defining risk assessment project timing
The timing of a risk assessment depends of the required deliverable
but the general principle is the earlier the better. Sometimes the
use of a life cycle approach can be helpful to consider the timing
of risk assessment (Figure 3.1). |
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Figure 3.1 The life cycle stages of a project.
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The Life Cycle illustrates the various stages in any project. The
most cost effective timing for risk assessment is in the concept
/ design phase. THIS IS A KEY ISSUE. Risk Assessments should,
at least, be done at the earliest possible point in each life cycle
stage.
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Table 3.1 Stage Issues
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Table
3.2 Applications of Assessment Methods  |
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Note: In
the preceding table Checklists are identified as an assessment technique.
A checklist identifies known hazards, potential design deficiencies
and potential incident situations associated with common equipment
or operations. It can be used for processes, equipment, materials
and procedures. It is most commonly used when there is a significant,
large body of experience or knowledge on the subject under study.
However general checklists can sometimes be used for new or unusual
designs.
The method is usually limited to ensuring that a process, piece of
equipment, material or procedure conforms to accepted standards.
Checklists are noted for being exclusive rather than inclusive in
the sense that if an issue is missing from the checklist it probably
will be ignored.
An example of a checklist for Acquisitions is given in the Appendices
(See
Acquisition Checklist). Checklists are not discussed any further
in the guideline.
LESSONS LEARNED 3.1
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3.5 |
Establishing clear accountability |
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The context (or procedure) must include the accountability for areas
such as; |
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initiation of a risk assessment in defined circumstances, |
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| planning
or scoping the risk assessment, |
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| meeting the resource requirements, |
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| utilisation of facilitators (including consideration of external resources
for complex assessments), |
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| methods for implementing deliverables, and
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| checking the quality of
risk assessment activities. |
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LESSONS LEARNED 3.2
Finally, there are many textbooks
available covering risk assessment, including a downloadable System
Safety text that covers many of the principles and tools mentioned
in this guideline.
For example, to explore more information
on various risk assessment approaches try: |
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http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Business/DMS/PDF/DHB-S-001.pdf
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3.6 |
Risk Assessment Pitfalls |
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Although risk assessment is a potentially powerful tool, as with all tools, if it is not used with care and understanding, the outcomes may well be totally incorrect and lead to bad decisions being made that are not supportable in reality.
A recent report by HSE in the UK examined a range of assessments and identified the following “common” pitfalls. |
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Carrying out a risk assessment to attempt to justify a decision that has already been made. |
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| Using generic assessment when a site specific assessment is needed. |
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| Carrying out a detailed, quantitative risk assessment without first considering whether any relevant good practice was applicable, or when relevant good practice exists. |
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| Carrying out a risk assessment using inappropriate good practice. |
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| Making decisions on the basis of individual risk estimates when societal risk is the appropriate measure. |
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| Only considering the risk from one activity. |
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| Dividing the time spent on the hazardous activity between several individuals – the “salami slicing” approach to risk estimation. |
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| Not involving a team of people in the assessment or not including employees with practical knowledge of the process/activity being assessed. |
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| Ineffective use of consultants. |
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| Failure
to identify all hazards associated with a particular activity.
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| Failure
to consider all possible outcomes.
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| Inappropriate
use of data.
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| Inappropriate
definition of a representative sample of events.
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| Inappropriate
use of risk criteria.
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| No consideration of ALARP arguments (i.e. using cost benefit analysis to attempt to argue that it is acceptable to reduce existing safety standards. |
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| Not doing anything with the results of the assessment. |
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| Not linking hazards with risk controls |
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The full report is available on the HSE website at: |
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http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr151.pdf
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